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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
RAY~10ND R. CANNON, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
JACK L. NEUBERGER and 
EVELYN L. NEUBERGER, 
Defendants and Respondents. t 
Civil No. 8083 
APPELLANT'S REPLY 
BRIEF 
STATEMENT 
Plaintiff deems this reply necessary in order to point 
out to this court some flagrant misstatements of fact and 
quotes of incomplete and disconnected bits of evidence, 
contained throughout respondents' brief in order that the 
real facts may not be lost sight of, and to answer such 
new matter as appears therein. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT No. 1: That the defendants in their brief 
gave no sufficient reasons based either upon the un-
disputed facts or upon the law applicable thereto in 
answer to· the points presented in Appellant's brief; 
and that inasmuch as Respondents presented their 
entire ARGUMENT under their single point, Appel-
lant will answer the same in like manner. 
Defendants' for example admit as they must do be-
cause there is no direct conflict in the evidence every-
thing stated in plaintiff's Statement of Facts concerning 
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the three huge Poplars, the· two Siberian Elms, and the 
disastrous consequences resulting therefrom, but say "they 
desire to point up some additional and what we feel to be 
highly pertinent facts." These "highly pertinent facts" so 
given are: 
That plaintiff stated Siberian Elms are a nuisance, 
that his neighbor Mary Beutler testified he obtained these 
trees from her and planted them himself, that plaintiff had 
a "large>> Siberian Elm close to his house, and that when 
asked why he did not cut it down, he first d~nied and 
then admitted he got the elms from the Beutlers. What 
does the record s~ow? Plaintiff, to mention only two 
places, (Tr. 45, 55) did so testify the two elms are a 
"nuisance" and it seems to t4e writer he gave good reasons 
for making the statement. But at no place did he say he 
planted the two Siberian Elms on defendants' property; in 
fact he stated he did not. (Tr. 47). Nor did Mrs. Beutler 
say he planted Siberian Elms on defendants' lot. She 
simply said that plaintiff obtained some trees from them 
when he bought his premises and that he planted them on 
his lot. (Tr. 83). He planted two of these trees on his 
parking lot, both of which were removed years ago, and 
one on his back lot which he intended to remove as he 
had hardwood trees to replace (and which has been 
removed). (Tr. 46). Nor did he, as defendants state bring 
the Siberian Elms on defendants> lot. But he did say seeds 
could have been blown northward from across the street 
( Beutlers) or from Fred Neuberger's place, immediately 
east of defendants' premises. But the defendants them-
selves planted two Siberian Elms on their own lot. ( Tr. 
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87). Nor is it stated anywhere in the record that the 
Siberian Elm on plaintiff's lot is a large one. It was planted 
under the overhanging branches of the Poplars on defend-
ants' lot and was not to exceed six inches in diameter. At 
no place did plaintiff deny he planted a tree on his lot nor 
on the parking in front of his premises. 
Counsel next stated on page 2 of brief that plaintiff 
did not claim any damage to his property which is termed 
by the court, "sensible damages," ~nd then quotes where 
the \Vriter of this brief waived damages; and then picks 
up another fragmentary bit of evidence to the effect that 
plaintiff claims he is entitled to have these trees removed 
because they shade his property. Because the record is 
so complete with so many other reasons for wanting the 
alleged nuisance abated, no further comment shall be 
made on this "shade" statement. Our Statute, Sec. 78-38-1, 
U. C. A., 1953, was quoted and commented on at page 8 
of Appellant's brief and the court's attention is directed 
thereto. It will be observed from a reading of the statute 
that it ends by 'providing: "and by the judgment the 
nuisance may be enjoined or abated, and damages may 
also be recovered." The damages referred to is no doubt 
monetary damages: It was only these that were waived. 
Futhermore, to "waive" does not imply that there were no 
damages; in fact the reverse is true. Under our statute, 
certainly no prejudice could result because plaintiff did 
not care to follow through for these damages. It will also 
be . observed from reading the cases cited herein, that in 
most instances relief was awarded without monetary dam-
ages. Most plaintiff simply want the nuisance removed 
so they can enjoy their property. In Coon vs. Utah Con-
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struction Co., (Utah) 228 P. 2d, 997, cited by defendants 
at page 7 of their brief, for example, the plaintiff failed to 
prove monetary damages and so this court failed to award 
any. But this court did not for that reason fail to grant 
the "nuisance" relief asked for. The plaintiff failed to 
prove the "nuisance" feature also. The facts in this case 
are entirely different from the facts in the case at bar, 
but it does indicate that because "monetary" damages are 
either not asked for nor awarded that this is no reason 
plaintiff is not entitled to the other relief provided for by 
the statute. 
Counsel for defendants states at page 2 of brief, and 
repeats at page 8, that after a view of the premises by the 
court, plaintiff then waived damages. This is not the fact. 
The record shows (Tr. 82) the court recessed at 12:05 and 
reconvened at 2.00 p. m. On the next page (Tr. 83), 
counsel for plaintiff waived damages. Defendants then 
put in their proof and at page 106 (Tr.) Mr. Preston says: 
"Do you want to go out in the rain and look around." Then 
at the bottom of next page (Tr. 107) the court says: "Be 
in recess until next Monday at 10 o'clock, and we can go 
up now and view the premises in question." Recessed at 
3:15p.m. The intended innuendo is wholly unwarranted 
because it is unsupported by the record, and because 
furthermore there is no evidence on the part of the de-
fendflnts refuting plaintiff's testimony as to size and con-
dition of trees, overhanging branches, damages done by 
root ·system, leaves, falling branches, etc. In fact, the 
plaintiff even volunteered to the court to spade any part 
of the premises desired by him. ( Tr. .50) . 
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At Tr. 37 plaintiff testified to the enormous quantities 
of leaves which fall upon his premises, due in part because 
the winds customarily blow westward out of Logan Can-
yon. At page 7 of brief ·consel states that it is a fair as-
sumption that plaintiff is an eccentric person because he 
complains that the winds carry leaves upon his premises 
and that the law of nuisances is not designed to assist such 
people in nuturing their own peculiarities. At page 10 of 
brief, closing sentence, counsel says: "However, we con-
clude that it is fortunate for our people that we will seldom 
find one so allergic to trees as is this plaintiff." And at 
page 7 of brief counsel says: "But, the Court further held 
that much of plaintiff's woes were idiocyncrisies, and that 
a normal and reasonable person would not have been 
affected." I think it would have been more helpful as well 
as fair had counsel discussed facts. However, I do not 
feel that such statements and criticism should go unchal-
lenged and so I shall answer the last first. 
The record shows (Tr. 49) that in college plaintiff 
majored in Education, Vocational Agriculture, and that 
he is now vocational agriculture instructor at South Cache 
High School. ( Tr. 27) . In fact he has held this position 
for some years. His wife, and F. A. Pehrson, expert testi-
fied to much the same line of testimony as did plaintiff, 
and so did his neighbor, Don Allen, but to a lesser extent. 
I have re-examined the Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and 
Judgment and Decree of the lower court, as well as the 
decision of the court shown at Tr. 108-109, and nowhere 
do I firid any such statement made by the court. It is 
inconceivable that the lower court would make such state-
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ment. Just why counsel for the defendants should regard 
the making of any such unfounded statement as either 
advisable, necessary or appropriate is not understandable 
to either the plaintiff or the writer of this brief. 
Next criticism. If the winds customarily blow out of 
Logan Canyon westward, and the trees themselves, as a 
result lean toward the west, and your home and other 
buildings and children and perhaps others are either in 
the path of these trees or underneath them in case they 
should be blown down, is this not an additional reason 
why the hazard is not increased by the wind, and cause 
for concern? F. A. Pehrson, expert, testified that he, 
"Wouldn't sleep myself if they were arotrnd my house at 
all." Is not such a wind an element? Because a person 
sees and recognizes such an element, and danger, is he 
eccentric? Is he nuturing a peculiarity? Especially, so, 
when there is not even evidence to the contrary produced 
by defendants. Is a person under these corcumstances 
to be called ellergic to trees? If so then the decisions of 
courts abound with relief being given to persons in the 
same plight as this plaintiff who seeks relief under statutes 
identical or similar to ours. It is submitted there is no 
merit to the criticism levelled at plaintiff. We believe the 
law of nuisances under our statute is designed to cover just 
such conditions. As stated in Erickson vs. Hudson, (Wyo.) 
249 P. 2d 523 at page 529, "What would be a nuisance in 
Belgrave square would not necessarily be so in Ber-
d " mon sey. 
Counsel next states on page 2 of brief that this action 
could be summed up by pointing to the "attitude" of 
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plaintiff towards his neighbors; and that a decision in this 
matter could have such far reaching effects to amount to 
a public tragedy. Let us therefore look at the facts for a 
moment and see who has the "attitude" in this case. Within 
an area of one square rod east of plaintiff's lot- between 
his fence line and the rear part of defendants' house - is 
concentrated three huge Carolina Poplars. And between 
the area back or south_ of the house and east of the garage 
- the garage is immediately south of the house - is con-
centrated four additional good-sized trees. (Tr. 95). It 
is fair to say that these four trees are concentrated within 
an area of two square rods south and east of the one square 
rod upon which stands the three poplars. It is submitted 
that common knowledge alone dictates that such a con-
centration of tree growth on such a small area so close to 
an adjoining neighbor is unreasonable and a greater bur-
den upon the soil than it can possibly support. The dam-
age resulting to a neighbor must be obvious without the 
testimony of an expert .. As an excuse for not wanting the 
three poplar trees abated, counsel at page 10 of brief states 
that the defendant is physically incapacitated and enjoys 
the shade. Assuming the reason given to have some legal 
significance, it would seem that whatever the real reason 
for not warJing the three poplars abated it could not be 
for "shade" reasons alone because there would still exist 
very close to the house the four mentioned additional trees. 
In fact these trees would duplicate much of the shade 
given by the poplars. And it would be difficult to see 
-vvhy for the same reason defendants would object to the 
removal of the two Siberian Elms. And further bearing 
on "attitude" is must be recalled that plaintiff before filing 
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suit (but not after) offered to pay the cost of removing 
the three poplars and two elms, if permission were given, 
and to plant in their place hardwood trees of defendants' 
own choosing. 
At Tr. 40, plaintiff testified defendant said, when 
asked if he would permit removal of the trees, "We decided 
I want to keep those trees because they're good for people" 
and also "for sentimental reason." "Therefore, we will not 
take them down. If they bother you, that's too bad. I 
won't remove them." Defendant did not deny making this 
statement, so it must be taken as true. I therefore think 
defendants' point on "attitude" of plaintiff is very poorly 
taken, and that instead of amounting almost to a public 
tragedy to grant plaintiff the relief prayed for, I think the 
reverse would be true, to fail to grant to plaintiff and to 
others, if any there are, who are obliged to suffer the 
consequences of such a concentrated tree growth so close 
to their property. It is submitted that the trees concen-
trated in such a small area to the rear of defendants' pro-
perty is "somewhat of a forest" and affords sufficient shade 
to accommodate a large herd of cows. 
At the bottom of page 2 and continuing on page 3 of 
brief, defendants cite and quote from Carter vs. Chotiner, 
(Cal.) 291 P. 577 to the effect that when appellants' acts 
create the same type of danger complained of, such acts 
may be considered in determining whether respondents' 
acts actually constitute a nuisance under all the circum-
stances. It is submitted that this case cannot help de-
fendants under the circumstances. The question still re-
mains whether the trees on defendants' premises consitute 
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a nuisance. The only thing defendants can mention is the 
Siberian Elm (not to exceed about six inches in diameter) 
which was standing under the shade of three poplars. 
Furthermore, in the case of Carter vs. Chotiner there was 
at least a conflict in the evidence, whereas in the case at 
bar there is no conflict at all regarding the hazard of the 
poplars, the overhanging branches, and the damage done 
by the roots, etc. In fact the roots of the poplar trees were 
identified as being the ones causing the damage. 
At page 5 of brief defendants cite and quote from 
Kubby vs. Hammond (Ariz.) 198 Pac. 2d. 134, as follows: 
"The proper remedy for minor inconveniences arising from 
an alleged nuisance lies in action for damages, rather than 
injunction." A reading of this case discloses that the ques-
tion involved was whether or not the operation of an auto 
\Vrecking business violates a rezoning ordinance and 
whether loud noises interfere with plaintiff's peaceable 
enjoyment of his home and cause a depreciation of the 
value thereof. At page 140 of the opinion the courts says: 
"However a single instance of offensive noise was 
shown to have occurred on September 11, 1946, when 
a motor was being removed from one of the cars. It 
is obvious that as applied to a situation of this kind 
such an. incident standing alone is wholly insufficient 
to sustain the issuance of an injuction. The mainten-
ance of a nuisance ordinarily implies a continuity or 
recurrence of action over a substantial period of time." 
It is believed that the quote supplied by counsel is so 
inapplicable to the facts in the case at bar as to require 
no further comment. Certainly the matters complained 
of by plaintiff in the case at bar are not minor. 
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Defendants at page 7 of brief cite and point to Erick-
son vs. Hudson, supra, as a well-reasoned case. The opin-
ion is rather long, but the facts are simple. The court 
ordered defendant to reduce the heighth of a "spite-
fence" erected from a purely malevolent spirit because it 
deprived plaintiff of air, light, and view. The court re-
cognized plaintiff's rights by ordering the fence reduced 
and the defendant's too by permitting the fence to stand 
regardless of the motive he had in erecting, but in per-
mitting the fence to stand the court was particular to see 
that no substantial or reasonable rights of the plaintiff 
were invaded. Consider the difference in the facts of the 
case at bar. No doubt the fence did not have "roots." It 
must also- be remembered that the trees on defendants' 
property are not "rootless" trees. The damage these roots 
cause plaintiff have not been contradicted. Nor is it 
denied that trimming the tops of the trees aguments roots 
growth and so increases the damages to plain~iff's property. 
In fact the trees were trimmed once before and this really 
solved nothing. At least part of the tops of the trees carry 
dead timber. In the case at bar the lower court simply 
recognized the height hazard when it ordered the tops 
reduced. It really did not fully or adequately, it is sub-
mitted, solve the problem as did the Wyoming court and 
it is further ventured that if this case had been before the 
Warning court it would have granted to plaintiff the relief 
prayed for. We think this case, is a holding in plaintiff's 
favor. 
Reference is made to pages 18-20 of appellant's brief 
where plaintiff cites and discusses Dahl vs. Utah Oil Ref. 
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Co. (Utah) 262 P. 269. Defendants also on pages 3-4 of 
their brief refer to and quote from this case. The facts are 
as different as the night is from day. In the Dahl case, 
plaintiff's home was located in an industrial section of Salt 
Lake City and about a 1000 feet or more away from plain-
tiff's business, which the court found was operated in a 
modern and well equipped plant and in a careful manner. 
It would be difficult to see how the conrt could make any 
such finding with refence to the tremendous tree growth 
on such a small area on defendant's lot having in mind that 
the parties here reside on adjoining lots in a closely built-
up residential section of Logan City. The defendants 
simply insist they have the right to maintain these large 
trees regardless of the consequences to plaintiff. ( Tr. 40). 
It is here pointed out that their "attitude" is in error and 
based upon a wrong conception of their rights as adjoining 
property owners. The facts in the case at bar are clearly 
distinguishable from those in the Dahl case and the quote 
supplied by defendants must be applied to the facts in 
that case. We think the law given in the Dahl case when 
r. pplied to the uncontroverted facts existing in the case at 
bar justified a holding in favor of plaintiff. But defendants 
next say the court found that they would be making a 
reasonable use of their property if they trimmed the trees 
to reduce the hazard. This appeal is taken because plain-
tiff believes the lower court misapplied th~ law to the 
undisputed facts. It is further submitted that the mere 
fact that the lower court viewed the premises cannot and 
does not in the least alter the undisputed facts testified to 
by the plaintiff which cannot and were not denied. 
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At page 4 of brief defendants say that the authorities 
are not in accord in the matter of trees being a nuisance, 
and then point out that some states follow what is known 
as the "Massachusetts rule" (Smith vs. Holt (Virginia) 
128 A. L. R. 1217, and the annotation there given, and 
others follow the so-called "California rule" Gostina vs. 
Ryland (Wash.) 199 Pac. 298. In this counsel for plain-
tiff begs to differ with defendants and desire to point out 
that in those western states where there exists a statute 
such as we have in Utah the decisions are uniform, and 
that in states (mostly southern and some eastern) where 
no such statute exists the so-called "Massachusetts rule" is 
followed. Plaintiff pointed this out in its brief filed herein 
at pages 12 to 20 and so to avoid duplication these same 
line of cases which defendants refer to at page 5 of their 
brief will not here be discussed. However, defendants 
state at page 4 of brief that the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia modified the "California rule" and then quotes from 
Bonde vs. Bishop, 245 P. 2d. 617. With this statement 
plaintiff disagrees and desires to point out that the quote 
is inapplicable and misapplied by defendants. By a re-
ference to that case will be observed that damages were 
disallowed because they were improperly pleaded. The 
'quote supplied applies to situations where the action 
brought is not based upon the nuisance statute, and Cali-
fornia also has a nuisance statute almost identical to ours. 
(See headnote 6). It is also interesting to note that in the 
Bonde case only one tree was complained of, whereas in 
the instance case complaint is made of three large trees, 
. each of which appears to be considerably larger, besides 
the two elms, and that while damages were disallowed 
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because improperly pleaded, yet the judgment of the court 
was permitted to stand. Counsel for defendants next argue 
at page 5 that unless the Dahl case is to be overruled this 
jurisdiction is committed to the "common sense" doctrine 
announced in Smith vs. Holt (Virginia) Supra, and from 
which he copiously quotes. The conclusion reached by 
counsel, ·it is submitted, does not follow, and inasmuch as 
this contention has been previously answered no further 
comment will be made, except to say that our Statute can-
not be ignored as must be done if the case of Smith vs. 
Holt is to be followed. 
Defendant recognizes at page 3 of brief that this court 
has not passed on the question here presented as it per-
tains to trees and yet at page 6 states that it would seem 
that this court has been· much slower to grant injunctions 
than those courts which follow the California rule relating 
to trees and then cite Kinsman vs. Utah Gas & Coke Co. 
177 P. 418, Ludlow vs. Colorado Animal By-Products C., 
137 P. 2d 347, Thompson vs. Anderson, 153 P. 2d 665, 
Coon vs. Utah Construction Co. 228 P. 2d 997 and Shaw 
vs. ·Salt Lake City 224 P. 2d 1037. These holdings are in 
line with holdings of other states involving similar ques-
tions. The writer has read all of these cases and for the 
reason that the facts therein are so entirely different no 
comment will be made because it seems that none of them 
could afford any precedent for the question here pre;. 
sented. It seems to the writer that the case of Shaw vs. 
Salt Lake City, supra, would have more bearing than any 
of the other cases cited because there the court held the 
construction and operation of a hot-mix asphalt plant in 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
the Cottonwood residential district a nuisance per se and 
the same was enjoined prior to commencement of construc-
tion. It also held that damages would provide no adequate 
compensation even if they could be obtained. It seems to 
the writer that the damages resulting to plaintiff are so 
aggravated that the trees complained about might also 
amount to a nuisance per se. 
Defendants also state at page 3 that the State Dept. 
of Agriculture provides a list of weeds which have been 
determined to be obnoxious, but that their search does not 
reveal wherein this state has declared any tree to be nox-
ious. The complete answer to such statement is, we believe 
first, that weeds are not an issue in this case; and secondly 
that Sec. 78-38-1, U. C. A., 1953, is provided. The mean-
ing of the word "noxious" has been treated at page 13 of 
Appellant's brief. The question under the statute is 
whether or not the trees in question constitute a nuisance. 
Clearly, the finest trees could under certain circumstances 
become noxious ones, just as a weed may, under certain 
circumstances, be a flower. And at page 8 the question 
is posed if plaintiff can compel the removal of these trees, 
how far outside his own property may he successfully use 
the injunction remedy; that the streets of Salt Lake City 
have been littered with branches and limbs (to say nothing 
of leaves) after winds (defendants could also have added 
littered w~th large trees blown thereupon) and that if 
plaintiff's request is granted, it may become an utter im-
possibility for the small lot owner to maintain trees and 
shrubs. That Logan (and it is conceded) is one of the 
most beautiful cities in Utah, that its streets are bordered 
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with ditches running with fresh clear mountain water and 
that in the fall leaves, etc. blow therein. Then asks, "Are 
these to be abated." No favorable comment is made in 
the evidence concerning the Siberian Elms on Washingtin 
St., Ogden. It is believed Ogden City would not again 
permit the planting of these trees on its streets because 
the danger of blowing over is too great. Certainly it is 
not the policy of Logan City to plant them. At any rate, 
the question in this case is the problem between two ad-
joining landowners. 
We think the defendants appear to be unduly alarmed. 
No such dire results have been reached where similar 
nuisance statutes have been enforced in Washington, Cali-
fornia, etc. Then too streets are not involved in this action. 
In this action the closest Elm asked to be abated is at least 
20 feet south of the ditch where runs water and the closest 
Poplar is 5 rods south thereof. If this court is to take 
judicial knowledge of the streets of Logan, and we suggest 
it does, then we desire to point out to this court that for 
more than twenty years last past and continuing to this 
very day, Logan City has at its own expense removed not 
only hundreds but many, many thousands of elms, poplars 
and other similar huge trees not only on the parking but 
on the property of property-owners growing close to the 
sidewalk,all of which were trees planted in a by-gone day. 
As a result Logan City now has many miles of its streets 
lined with beautiful hardwood trees, namely maple and 
white ash and linden. Never heard of a problem resulting 
from leaves from these trees cluttering up the ditches and 
culverts. As elsewhere the citizens of Logan solve this 
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problem. It is difficult to see where any pronouncement 
resulting from a favorable decision to plaintiff in this case 
will adversely affect any small lot owner in the reasonable 
use of his property in the growing of trees, shrubs, etc. 
We believe counsel's fears are unwarranted. 
In conclusion it is submitted that defendants have not 
in their brief given any reasons either upon the facts or 
upon the law applicable to the undisputed facts which 
warrant in law upholding the decision of the lower court 
and that the same should be reversed giving to plaintiff 
the relief prayed for, together with his costs expended 
herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE C. HEINRICH, 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant. 
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